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Abstract
Background: On 6th April 2018, the UK Government introduced the Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL) as a mechanism
designed to address increasing prevalence of obesity and associated ill health by reducing sugar consumption. Given
that the successful introduction of upstream food and nutrition policies is a highly political enterprise involving multiple
interested parties, understanding the complex network of stakeholders seeking to influence such policy decisions
is imperative.
Methods: Media content analysis was used to build a dataset of relevant newspaper articles, which were analysed to
identify stakeholder agreement or disagreement with defined concept statements. We used discourse network analysis to
produce visual representations of the network of stakeholders and coalitions evident in the debate as it was presented in
UK newspapers, in the lead up to and following the announcement of the Soft Drinks Industry Levy in the UK, from May
2015 to November 2016.
Results: Coding identified 3883 statements made by 214 individuals from 176 organisations, relating to 47 concepts.
Network visualisations revealed a complex network of stakeholders with clear sceptical and supportive coalitions. Industry
stakeholders appeared less united in the network than anticipated, particularly before the SDIL announcement. Some key
industry actors appeared in the supportive coalition, possibly due to the use of corporate social responsibility rhetoric.
Jamie Oliver appeared as a dominant stakeholder, firmly embedded with public health advocates.
Conclusion: This study highlights the complexity of the network of stakeholders involved in the public debate on food
policies such as sugar tax and the SDIL. Polarisation of stakeholders arose from differences in ideology, focus on a specific
policy and statements about the weight of evidence. Vocal celebrity policy entrepreneurs may be instrumental in gaining
public and policy makers’ support for future upstream regulation to promote population health, to facilitate alignment
around a clear ideology.
Keywords: Public health policy, UK soft drinks industry levy, SDIL, SSB tax, Discourse network analysis, Media content
analysis, Unhealthy commodity industries
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Background
On 6th April 2018, the United Kingdom (UK) Government
introduced a Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL) commonly
referred to as the “sugar tax”. The levy was intended to re-
duce sugar consumption, primarily through reformulation
by soft drinks manufacturers to reduce sugar content and
avoid paying the levy [1, 2]. Excess consumption of free
sugars is a contributory factor in the rising prevalence of
non-communicable diseases (NCDs), both as a direct cause
[3, 4] and through the contribution to energy imbalance
resulting in obesity [5]. In 2015 the World Health Organ-
isation (WHO) issued guidance on sugars consumption for
adults and children, recommending reducing intake of free
sugars to less than 10%, and ideally less than 5%, of total
energy intake [6]. In the lead up to UK Government’s
introduction of the SDIL, there was much policy debate
about how to achieve this goal [7, 8], with evidence sug-
gesting the need for upstream policy intervention [9–11].
Products containing tobacco and alcohol have long been
subjected to taxation, which was traditionally seen as a
way of raising revenue for public spending [12]. More
recently, there is increased emphasis on taxation of these
products to promote population health, given the inverse
relationship between price and consumption [13–16].
However, the role of price increases through taxation in
food and nutrition policy is not clear-cut [12, 17, 18]. Sassi
et al. note that, in the case of foods, the value of using
taxes depends upon their design and the context in which
they are applied [12]. Specifically, if people are aware that
a product is taxed for public health reasons, rather than to
raise revenue, they may be more likely to change their
consumption [18]. A number of governments around the
world have adopted taxation of selected energy-dense
foods and drinks [19]. A recent policy analysis describing
13 international case studies concluded that taxation
seemed to have the desired effects on prices and con-
sumption of energy-dense products [19].
The successful introduction of upstream food and nutri-
tion policies is a highly political enterprise with multiple
vested interests [20]. Stakeholders include politicians, the
commercial sector, public health professionals, academics,
non-government organisations, government advisors, jour-
nalists, public figures such as celebrities, and grassroots
organisations [21]. The example of the Danish ‘fat tax’,
implemented in 2011 and abolished after only 15months
despite recent evidence of its success [22], highlights ten-
sions between stakeholders. Bødker et al. note that active
industry lobbying and judicial actions undermined policy
support [23]. This illustrates the highly politicised nature
of introducing new policies when the evidence base is
limited and policies are opposed by those with vested cor-
porate interests [20]. Research suggests that one reason
governments do not pursue upstream approaches to food
and nutrition policy is the power and influence of the food
industry [20, 24–26]. Understanding industry influence in
such public policy debates is challenging given the complex
network of stakeholders involved. As Smith et al. note,
understanding this network of stakeholders, their relation-
ships, and interactions is necessary for elucidating
advocacy strategies to counter industry and protect
public health [27].
One theory of policy change or stability, the Advocacy
Coalition Framework, suggests that policy subsystems
are formed around competing advocacy coalitions,
which are based on shared ideological belief systems.
Changes in core policy preferences by political actors
result in changes in the balance of coalitions and hence
policy shifts [28, 29]. Leifeld suggests that the articu-
lation of policy beliefs by interest groups in the media
and other arenas, in the form of discourses, reveals their
policy preferences and encourages other stakeholders in
the policy debate to support them or reveal their oppo-
sition [30]. Mapping of such agreement or disagreement
in discursive forums can produce representations of
advocacy coalitions and policy networks [30]. Thus,
network analysis can be used to explore the complex
interactions and alliances that stakeholders form in
attempting to influence government policy [21, 31–33].
Social network analysis has been used in tobacco con-
trol policy debates to highlight the polarisation of oppos-
ing coalitions and draw attention to the complex
processes of consensus-seeking, alliance-building, and
strategic action, which are integral to the development
of policy [33]. In the case of Minimum Unit Pricing
(MUP) for alcohol, discourse network analysis (DNA)
[34, 35], a combination of category-based content ana-
lysis and social network analysis, has been used to pro-
vide insights into the formation of discourse coalitions
and cast light on the complexity of alignments between
stakeholders engaged in the MUP debate as cited in UK
newspapers [36]. Whilst Hilton et al. found that both
proponents and opponents of the SDIL actively engaged
with the news media to promote framings that would
advance their interests [37], there is little evidence on
how the complex network of coalitions and alliances of
stakeholders formed and changed during the SDIL
policy debate, and how those networks may have impacted
the Conservative Party’s shift in policy position and adop-
tion of the regulation.
This study uses DNA to offer the first visual represen-
tation of the network of stakeholders and advocacy coa-
litions apparent in UK newspaper content in the lead-up
to, and following, the announcement of the SDIL in the
UK. Specifically we aim to: (i) determine the member-
ship of coalitions active in the debate and how these
developed over the period of policy debate (May 2015 to
November 2016); (ii) explore alliances and cleavages
across different sectors/interest groups; and (iii) generate
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network insights on industry lobbying, campaigning, and
policy advocacy.
Methods
Data extraction and content analysis
We employed media content analysis methods established
by Hilton and colleagues to build a dataset of relevant
newspaper articles [38–40]. We selected eight UK and
three Scottish newspapers with their Sunday counterparts.
Further detail is provided in Additional file 1. The publi-
cations with high circulation figures were chosen to
represent three genres of newspaper (quality/broad-
sheet, mid-market, and tabloid) covering a range of
readerships profiles in relation to age, social class, and
political alignment [41].
A 19-month period from May 2015 to November 2016
was selected to cover key events and publications sur-
rounding the SDIL policy debate. Specifically: (i) the
publication of research on health harms of excessive
sugar consumption and evidence for appropriate policy
action [6, 42, 43]; (ii) the House of Commons sugary
drinks tax policy debate [7]; (iii) the publication of an
early evaluation of a sugar tax policy in Mexico [44]; (iv)
the announcement of the SDIL in March 2016 [45]; and
(v) the public and industry consultation on SDIL proposals
[46, 47] (Table 1).
After testing various terms, the search terms [“sugar”
OR “beverage”] (in the headline) AND [“tax” OR “levy”]
(anywhere in the text) were used to identify relevant
articles in the Nexis database [48]. The search identified
995 articles, 834 after removal of duplicates. All articles
were read to determine whether they met the
pre-defined inclusion criteria, i.e.: (i) “sugar tax”/SDIL
being the primary focus; (ii) citing one or more stake-
holders (as a direct quotation or a comment that was
directly attributable to the stakeholder); and (iii) the type
of article being news, commentary or feature piece. After
exclusions, 511 articles were included for analysis.
All 511 articles were exported to the software tool
Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) [35, 49, 50]. Using
the DNA software, researchers coded extracts of news-
paper text which featured stakeholders’ arguments on
“sugar tax”, SSB tax, or the SDIL as “statements”. State-
ments are ensembles of four variables: individual stake-
holder’s name (where available), organisational affiliation
of the stakeholder (the “actor”), the argument referred to
by the stakeholder (the “concept”), and a dichotomous
variable for the stakeholder’s agreement or disagreement
with the concept (“agreement”). Two researchers in-
dependently double-coded a 10% sample of articles using
an initial set of concepts based on earlier analysis of the
minimum unit pricing (MUP) for alcohol debate [36].
After discussing inconsistencies and making refinements
to the concept statements and coding framework to
include new concepts specific to the SDIL debate, all arti-
cles were coded. In total, coding identified 3883 state-
ments made by 214 individuals from 176 organisations,
relating to 47 concepts. Details of the stakeholders and
concepts coded are provided in Additional file 2.
Network visualisation and analysis
A weighted stakeholder × stakeholder matrix was created
using the DNA software, where common agreement or
disagreement between stakeholders on individual concepts
was represented by ties and their relative weights. The
“subtract” transformation with “average activity normali-
sation” [49] was applied. The subtract transformation
measures argumentative similarity in excess of differences
of opinion. That is, a tie weight between two actors is
expressed as the number of concepts on which these
actors have identical opinions minus the number of
concepts on which these actors have diverging opinions.
The normalisation of tie weights ensures that only argu-
mentative similarity, but not the rate at which stake-
holders issue statements, is considered for the calculation
Table 1 Timeline of events leading to the introduction of the
UK Soft Drinks Industry Levy
Date Event/publication
Jun-Sep
2014
Public consultation on the Scientific Advisory Committee
on Nutrition (SACN) draft report “Carbohydrates and
Health”
Mar 2015 World Health Organisation guideline “Sugars intake for
adults and children”
Jul 2015 Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition report
“Carbohydrates and health”
Sep 2015 Jamie Oliver parliamentary petition “Introduce a tax on
sugary drinks in the UK to improve our children’s health” –
received 155,516 signatures
Oct 2015 Public Health England report “Sugar reduction: The
evidence for action”
Nov 2015 Parliamentary debate on public petition “Introduce a tax
on sugary drinks in the UK to improve our children’s
health”
Jan 2016 BMJ study “Beverage purchases from stores in Mexico
under the excise tax on sugar sweetened beverages:
observational study”
Mar 2016 Budget announcement: proposals for a Soft Drinks Industry
Levy (SDIL)
June 2016 Referendum on UK’s membership of the European Union
Aug-Oct
2016
Public consultation on SDIL proposals
Aug 2016 UK Government obesity strategy “Childhood obesity: A
plan for action”
Mar 2017 Budget announcement: confirmation of plans for a
UK-wide SDIL
Mar 2017 Health Affairs study “Sustained consumer response:
evidence from two-years after implementing the sugar
sweetened beverage tax in Mexico”
Apr 2018 Introduction of the SDIL in the UK
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of tie weights. This is done by dividing the tie weights by
the average number of concepts the two actors mention
throughout the policy debate. A threshold value of ≥0.4
was applied to the tie weights in the resulting network,
and tie weights lower than this threshold value were
replaced by 0. This was done to retain only relatively
robust argumentative similarity as ties in the network [49],
in order break down the complexity of the debate to a
manageable level and make coalitions visible.
The stakeholder × stakeholder network was imported
into the network visualisation software Visone [51] to
map-out visually the stakeholders and their coalitions.
Exported network matrices are provided in additional
data (Additional files 3, 4 and 5). Girvan-Newman edge-
betweenness community detection, a common graph clus-
tering algorithm [52], was applied to the network in order
to identify coalitions as cohesive subgroups with similar
argumentative patterns. The coalitions were highlighted in
the network visualisation as blue hyperplanes. Stakeholder
types were highlighted using colours, and the frequency of
citations for each stakeholder was visualised as the size of
the respective node. Network measures were used to de-
scribe the overall network and main clusters: size (number
of nodes), centralisation (a measure of how skewed the
distribution of all actors’ connections is [53]), density
(number of ties as a proportion of the theoretical max-
imum [54]), and external ratio (number of ties to nodes
outside the identified cluster as a proportion of total ties).
In addition to the overall network visualisation, separate
network visualisations were analysed for two time-periods:
May 2015 – mid-January 2016 and mid-January 2016 –
November 2016. This allowed the examination of the
formation of coalitions and any changes in position for
stakeholders in the debate both before and after the
shift in government policy on SSB taxation, which
became apparent in newspaper reporting of the debate
in January 2016 [55].
An analysis of bipolarisation over time was used to
illustrate the degree of polarisation into two distinct
coalitions over the time-period considered. Polarisation
is the tendency of the factions, or clusters, in the dis-
course network to be segregated and not show any over-
lap in policy beliefs. For example, if the supportive
cluster and the sceptical cluster show very little simila-
rity in arguments and positions, the two coalitions can
be said to be relatively polarised. In contrast, if there are
many intermediaries who blur the boundaries between
the coalitions, the extent of bipolarisation is relatively
small. Bipolarisation can change over time, and we
analysed how polarised the coalitions were at any point
in the observation period using a temporally smoothed
curve of network modularity. Modularity is a common
measure in network analysis for measuring the tendency
of a network to have clearly delineated clusters [56].
More specifically, the following measures were applied
to the discourse network to measure bipolarisation.
At any time point, bipolarisation was computed by first
applying 11 different graph clustering techniques that
permit specifying the number of desired clusters k = 2 in
advance; then computing network modularity [56] for
each of the 11 cluster solutions; and finally choosing
the maximal modularity value among the 11 values as
a measure of bipolarisation. Bipolarisation through
modularity of the optimal k = 2 cluster structure expresses
the tendency of the network to fall into exactly two
clusters, or “coalitions.” This bipolarisation measure was
smoothed over time by executing these steps for a window
of 200 statements, moving the time window forward by
one statement, and re-computing the bipolarisation
measure each time until the end of the empirical po-
licy debate was reached. The bipolarisation values for
each consecutive 200-statement window were visualised
in a time series diagram, with each time window centred
around the respective date, and a LOESS (Local Poly-
nomial Regression) smoother was fitted through the
resulting curve to indicate trends more clearly.
Results
Network overview – supporters and sceptics’ coalitions
The coalitions active in the sugar debate in UK media
coverage are shown in Fig. 1. The two main coalitions
can be characterised as either broadly supportive or
sceptical of fiscal policies to control sugar consumption
as a way of dealing with obesity (henceforth referred to
as “supportive” and “sceptical” coalitions respectively).
There are more stakeholders in the supportive coalition
(n = 95) than in the sceptical coalition (n = 65) (Table 2).
The supportive coalition consists primarily of organisa-
tions categorised as health charities, health campaign
groups, professional associations, advisory bodies, NHS
representatives, and international bodies such as the
World Health Organisation (WHO). Prominent, fre-
quently cited supporters include Public Health England,
the World Health Organisation and Jamie Oliver (an
English chef and restaurateur, more recently known as a
campaigner for healthy food for children). In contrast,
the sceptical coalition comprised representatives from
the food and drink industry, specifically the soft drinks
industry, retailers, restaurants and economic analysts
and think tanks. Prominent sceptics in this coalition
include the British Soft Drinks Association, Coca-Cola,
AG Barr, and the UK Government.
A number of stakeholder types do not appear ex-
clusively in one coalition or the other. Political parties,
government departments, commercial research organi-
sations, and academics are spread across both coalitions.
This spread reflects the complexity of the debate in
relation to policy responses to obesity and views on the
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likely effectiveness of taxation changing over time. A few
stakeholders appear isolated in the opposite coalition to
other stakeholders of the same type. For example, the
British Dietetic Association is the only professional asso-
ciation to appear in the sceptical coalition, and only
three representatives from the food and drink indus-
try (Abokado, Sainsbury’s and the British Retail Con-
sortium) appear in the supportive coalition (Fig. 1).
The total external ratio (Table 2) is defined as the
number of extra-coalition ties of an actor over all ties
the actor possesses, averaged over all actors in a given
coalition. It provides a measure of the number of
co-agreements and co-disagreements between stake-
holders in one coalition with stakeholders in the oppos-
ing coalition. The comparison of the two coalitions
indicates a lower total external ratio for the supportive
coalition. This suggests the stakeholders in this coalition
were less likely to agree with arguments made by stake-
holders in the sceptical coalition. The higher external
ratio for the sceptical coalition may be due to the com-
mon agreement that obesity is a significant health prob-
lem requiring attention and reflects social responsibility
messages used by the food and drink industry in adopting
similar framings to those of public health advocates. In
line with the external ratio, the supportive coalition also
has a slightly greater degree of centralisation (Table 2).
Centralisation measures the extent to which a few
Fig. 1 Discourse network for all stakeholders in the full time period. Legend: Nodes are uniform size to ensure the high number of stakeholder
nodes are visible (BSDA: British Soft Drink Association; WHO: World Health Organisation)
Table 2 Network measures for the two main coalitions
Network measure Full
network
Supportive
cluster
Sceptical
cluster
Size
(number of nodes)
176 95 65
Centralisation 29.8% 39.7% 36.9%
Density 0.13 0.29 0.24
Total external ratio 0.05 0.12
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selected actors dominate a coalition by having more links
to others than the remaining actors.
Development of coalitions over time
Temporal analysis of bipolarisation modularity measures
indicates that the tendency of the network to fall into
precisely two coalitions changed in line with key policy
events and publications (Fig. 2). Peaks in the bipolarisation
curve over time show how the discourse network de-
veloped more clear-cut, mutually opposing coalitions in
the policy process over time. The higher the curve, the
stronger the tendency of the coalitions to distance them-
selves from the respective other coalition, the fewer bro-
kers exist between coalitions, and the more homogeneity
of arguments within each coalition. The first peak coin-
cides with the publication of the Public Health England
report “Sugar reduction: the evidence for action” in
October 2015 [43] and a period of intense campaigning by
Jamie Oliver, culminating in the parliamentary debate in
November. The smaller second peak occurs in January
2016 around the time of the publication of a BMJ report
suggesting that the tax on sugar-sweetened beverages in
Mexico was associated with reductions in purchases of
taxed beverages and increases in purchases of untaxed
beverages [44]. The final sharp rise follows the
government’s change in policy position in January and the
announcement of the SDIL in March 2016. The elevated
level of bipolarisation continued during the SDIL con-
sultation period.
We present network visualisations for two time-periods,
before and after mid-January 2016 (Figs. 3 and 4). This
coincided with the government’s apparent shift in policy
position and the publication of evidence of the efficacy of
a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) in Mexico in
the British Medical Journal on 6 January 2016 [44]. Net-
work measures show a 40% increase in sceptics entering
the debate after Jan 2016, particularly from the soft drinks
industry, together with higher density and centralisation
for the sceptical coalitions both before and after January
2016 (Table 3). This is possibly because the specific policy
option mentioned at this time was a tax on sugary drinks.
Pre January 2016: emphasis on defining the problem and
perceptions of a general sugar tax
The network during the early time-period reflects the
period of intense campaigning by sugar taxation advo-
cates, including Jamie Oliver, campaign group Action on
Sugar, advisory body Public Health England, and profes-
sional associations, most notably the British Medical
Association and the Royal Society for Public Health
Fig. 2 Network bipolarisation from July 2015 to November 2016
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(Fig. 3). The node representing Jamie Oliver is the
second largest in the network after Public Health
England, indicating the scale of his presence in the
debate in this period, larger than any of the soft drinks
manufacturers or political stakeholder nodes. The node is
entrenched within the coalition broadly supportive of
action, with no ties to industry representatives. At the
time Jamie Oliver appeared to embark on personal cru-
sade: highlighting the problems arising from excess sugar
consumption, particularly for young people, in the press
and his TV documentary “Sugar Rush”; calling for an SSB
tax as a solution to this problem, going as far implement-
ing such a tax in his own restaurants and initiating a par-
liamentary petition on the subject; and demanding
personal action from the then Prime Minister David Cam-
eron [57]. Campaign groups, professional bodies and
health charities have an average external ratio of zero at
this time, indicating close agreement and no ties to any
stakeholders in the sceptics’ coalition (Table 4).
Unsurprisingly the Labour party appears in the supportive
coalition in opposition to the stance of the Conservative
party in power at the time.
By comparison, nodes representing the food and drink
industry are smaller, indicating less activity, and they are
spread across two apparent sub-clusters within the scep-
tical coalition (Fig. 3). One sub-cluster comprises retail
organisations (most prominently Tesco’s and Waitrose)
restaurants (for example Moshimo) and two food and
drink manufacturers (most prominently Coca-Cola). The
other comprises a more diverse mix of stakeholders
including politicians, government departments and
advisors (most significantly the Conservative Party, UK
Government and Department of Health), representatives
of food and drink manufacturers such as the UK Food
and Drink Federation and the British Soft Drinks Asso-
ciation, one think tank (the Institute for Economic
Affairs), one academic (Cornell University) and one pro-
fessional association (the British Dietetic Association).
Stakeholders in sub-cluster one appear unified around
concepts such as “the food and drink industry is already
Fig. 3 Discourse network highlighting the position and relative prominence of key stakeholders: pre Jan 2016. Legend: Selected stakeholders are
labelled to highlight the position and relative prominence of key actors. (AoS: Action on Sugar; BMA: British Medical Association; BSDA: British Soft
Drinks Association; FDF UK: UK Food and Drink Federation; IEA: Institute of Economic Affairs; Jamie: Jamie Oliver; PHE: Public Health England;
RSPH: Royal Society for Public Health)
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taking voluntary action”, and “industry plays an active
role in public health promotion”, while those in sub-
cluster two share concepts emphasising the inappro-
priate nature of taxation (as an intervention in the
market and a regressive tax) and that “working in partner-
ship with industry is a better way of tackling obesity”.
Only four representatives of soft drinks manufacturers
appear at this time, the British Soft Drinks Association,
Coca-Cola, AG Barr, and the Mexican Beverage Asso-
ciation. Overall, the soft drinks industry stakeholder group
has an average external ratio of 0.18 (Table 4), suggesting
a relatively high number of links to the supportive coa-
lition. Statements made by industry representatives in
newspapers suggest their use of corporate social responsi-
bility rhetoric to soften anti-legislation messages. It is pos-
sible that this strategy increases their agreement with
supporters and hence the relatively high external ratio for
this stakeholder category.
The UK Government and the Conservative party are
broadly aligned with the manufacturers and opposing
Fig. 4 Discourse network highlighting the position and relative prominence of key stakeholders: post Jan 2016. Legend: Selected stakeholders are
labelled to highlight the position and relative prominence of key actors. (AoS: Action on Sugar; BRC: British Retail Consortium; BSDA: British Soft Drinks
Association; CRUK: Cancer Research UK; UK FDF: UK Food and Drink Federation; FSS: Food Standards Scotland UK; IEA: Institute of Economic Affairs;
Jamie: Jamie Oliver; NOF: National Obesity Forum; PHE: Public Health England; TPA: TaxPayer’s Alliance; WHO: World Health Organisation)
Table 3 Network measures for the two main coalitions: pre and post Jan 2016
Network measure Supportive cluster Sceptical cluster
Pre Jan 2016 Post Jan 2016 Pre Jan 2016 Post Jan 2016
Size (number of nodes) 67 68 29 40
Centralisation 36.2% 34.0% 43.1% 41.1%
Density 0.28 0.26 0.38 0.32
Total external ratio 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.10
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stakeholders in their statements during this period and
appear in the opposite coalition to government advisory
bodies such as Public Health England. Similarly, the
Department of Health is firmly embedded in the scep-
tical coalition with ties to the Conservative party and
food and drinks industry spokespeople, specifically the
UK Food and Drink Federation and the British Soft
Drinks Association.
Post January 2016: alliances and cleavages following policy
announcement
The network illustrating the later time-period shows
apparent movement of key stakeholders (Fig. 4). There is
an increase in activity by food and drink industry repre-
sentatives as indicated by the size and number of brown
(soft drinks manufacturers and trade associations) and
yellow (food and drink industry more generally) nodes,
perhaps reflecting the newly established policy focus on
sugary drinks. The British Soft Drinks Association, Coca
Cola, and the UK Food and Drink Federation are par-
ticularly prominent and central to the sceptics’ coalition,
suggesting their leadership in framing arguments against
the SDIL. Representation from soft drinks manufacturers
increases from four to eleven, with Britvic, Lucozade
Ribena Suntory, Nichols, and Pepsi among the new stake-
holders appearing in the sceptical coalition. However,
there continues to be a relatively high average external
ratio for stakeholders in this group (0.15 for the food and
drink industry generally and 0.11 for the soft drinks
industry specifically) (Table 4). These findings suggest
some level of agreement between sceptics in the food
and drink industry and supporters of the policy and
once again this seems to be related to ongoing corpo-
rate social responsibility messages.
The nodes in the sceptical coalition appear to have con-
verged, from two sub-clusters into one. Key stakeholders
are brought together by concepts criticising SSB taxation as
“an unfairly punitive tax on the soft drinks industry” and
“questioning its likely effectiveness as a policy measure”;
perhaps reflecting the emergence of the SDIL as the
favoured policy option. The number of think tanks and an-
alysts in the debate increases from one to four, all appearing
in the sceptical coalition. Two in particular align with in-
dustry stakeholders, the Institute for Economic Affairs and
The Taxpayers Alliance, with external ratios of zero.
While the soft drinks industry appears to align around ar-
guments against the SDIL, retail organisations are less con-
sistent in their opposition; two key stakeholders, Sainsbury’s
and the British Retail Consortium, appear in the supportive
coalition (Fig. 4), and the average external ratio for retail
stakeholders is 0.15 (Table 4). Such industry cleavages may
reflect the degree to which the specific industry stake-
holders consider themselves directly threatened by the pol-
icy; as the retail sector is less likely to be damaged by SDIL,
they can distance themselves from anti-legislation messages
and reinforce their role in promoting public health.
Across the time-period, the UK Conservative party shifts
from a position aligned with industry to a position at the
core of the supportive coalition, closely aligned with Public
Health England and Food Standards Scotland. The timing
of this shift may be partly explained by contextual factors
(Table 1). Namely: the publication of persuasive evidence of
health harms related to excess sugar consumption, particu-
larly for young people [43]; the subsequent period of in-
tense campaigning by Jamie Oliver with attendant media
coverage and the evidence emerging from Mexico on the
potential effectiveness of SSB taxation [44]. In this second
time-period, all political parties move into the supportive
coalition, with one exception (the UK Independence Party),
and the overall external ratio for the political party stake-
holder group reduces from 0.18 to 0.05 (Table 4). This sug-
gests greater alignment with health campaigners and other
policy supporters (most prominently Jamie Oliver, the Na-
tional Obesity Forum, Action on Sugar, Cancer Research
UK and the World Health Organisation) and may have
been facilitated by the policy focus on the SDIL rather than
more general discourse on sugar taxation.
Discussion
This study highlights the complexity of the network of
stakeholders and their involvement in the debate on
sugar tax and the SDIL. Our analysis identified the in-
volvement of a large number of stakeholders, and some
Table 4 Average external ratios by type of stakeholder
organisation: pre and post Jan 2016
Stakeholder organisation type Average external ratios
Pre Jan 2016 Post Jan 2016
Political party 0.18 0.05
Government department 0.31 0.07
Local government 0.21 0.00
Advisory body 0.13 0.07
Professional association 0.00 0.14
NHS 0.05 0.00
International body 0.06 0.00
Health charity 0.00 0.19
Campaign group 0.00 0.01
University/Academic 0.10 0.12
Soft drinks industry 0.18 0.11
Food and drink industry 0.13 0.15
Retailer/Retail association 0.10 0.15
Restaurant 0.23 0.00
Think tank/Analyst 0.00 0.14
Research consultancy 0.13 0.13
Consumer group 0.06 –
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apparent divisions within the food and drink industry
and commonalities between some industry segments
and public health advocates. The coalitions changed
over time, with peaks in bipolarisation coinciding with
publication of evidence on the health harms of excess
sugar consumption and policy announcements. In the
first time-period, polarisation appears to arise primar-
ily from ideological positioning (whether or not tax-
ation of any kind is an appropriate measure), whereas
later it comes from contradictory positions on whether
or not SSBs are the appropriate target of policy regula-
tion. The impact of the unexpected policy announce-
ment in early 2016 may have contributed to the
increased bipolarisation of the network and alignment
within both supportive and sceptical coalitions, as
stakeholders united to strengthen their positions in re-
sponse to a specific policy.
Corporate social responsibility strategies represent an
important mechanism by which controversial, or poten-
tially socially harmful, industries seek to mitigate the
level of controversy arising from their business activities
[58]. Fooks et al. suggest that corporate social respon-
sibility activities allow corporate stakeholders, such as
those in the tobacco industry, to justify ethically prob-
lematic market actions that promote economic interests
over public health concerns [59]. One example observed
in the alcohol industry is the dissemination of health
information to the public while misrepresenting the evi-
dence of health harms associated with their products
[60, 61]. In the case of the SSB industry, manufacturers
have sought to emphasise the importance of physical
activity over calorie restriction in dealing with obesity; as
exemplified by Coca-Cola’s investment in the Global En-
ergy Balance Network [62]. Our analysis of discourse
networks suggests a more complex interplay between
protecting profitability and corporate social responsibil-
ity strategies in the case of the SDIL debate. Different
sectors of the food and drink industry present different
views, resulting in unanticipated commonality between
some industry sectors and public health campaigners,
and cleavages between industry segments. Retailers and
retail associations, manufacturers and restaurants were
not entirely aligned in their media statements. Parts of
the retail sector were situated outside the sceptical coali-
tion, including Sainsbury’s, the British Retail Consor-
tium, and Abokado (a retailer and manufacturer with a
mission to “lead happier and healthier lives”), reinforcing
their position as being “part of the solution” [63]. In
contrast, soft drinks manufacturers appeared in the
sceptical coalition alongside think tanks and economic
analysts, drawn together by similar statements character-
ising the policy as unfair, an inappropriate intervention
in the market and too simplistic. This set of arguments
is familiar from alcohol industry opposition to the
Minimum Unit Pricing policy [64], and other so-called
unhealthy commodity industries [65].
The prominence of public health advocates and cam-
paigner nodes in the supportive coalition perhaps reflects
intense lobbying by these stakeholders prior to the
announcement of the policy. A recent review of public
health advocacy to reduce health inequalities revealed in-
consistencies in framing of policy and a lack of coherence
between theory and action, which resulted in multiple bar-
riers to consistent public health advocacy [66]. In contrast,
the networks revealed by this study of the public debate
on the SDIL suggest unity among public health advocates
on the scale of the problem and the importance of regula-
tory action. Two factors that may have facilitated alliances
in support of the SDIL may have been that, firstly, the levy
was designed to both encourage industry reformulation
and reduce individual consumption, and secondly, the levy
targeted a commodity that can be linked directly to health
harms with no nutritional benefit.
Conversely, we suggest that the food and drink indus-
try is inconsistent in their lobbying tactics. In studies of
other industries’ efforts to influence policy, stakeholders
are portrayed as employing consistently effective tactics
to oppose upstream regulation, including the use of a
playbook of succinct, well-drilled messages delivered by
central spokespeople [61, 65, 67, 68]. In contrast, this
study demonstrates that the structure of the sceptical
coalition pre January 2016 takes the form of two sub-co-
alitions representing industry sub-sectors; one emphasis-
ing public health framing of the debate (supermarkets and
retailers), and the other focusing on ideological arguments
(food and drink industry, politicians and think tanks). Post
January 2016, the sceptical coalition appears to be more
aligned. It is dominated by soft drinks manufacturers,
their representatives and think tanks, with Coca-Cola and
the British Soft Drinks Association at its heart. Represen-
tatives of retailers and restaurants either become periph-
eral to the coalition or move to the supportive coalition,
along with most politicians. Stakeholders in this more co-
hesive sceptical coalition are united by concepts criticising
SSB taxation as a regressive, unfair, punitive tax on the
soft drinks industry and questioning its likely effectiveness
as a policy measure, while reinforcing corporate social re-
sponsibility rhetoric. This suggests that soft drinks manu-
facturers were less coordinated before the SDIL
announcement, perhaps believing that existing voluntary
agreements with government, in the form of the Public
Health Responsibility Deal [69], would protect them from
further regulation. In other words, the industry may have
been caught off-guard. This suggestion is supported by
the position of the UK Government and the Conservative
party in the network in the early time-period, when their
statements were aligned with industry representatives in
the sceptics’ coalition.
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Kingdon defines policy entrepreneurs as “people who
are willing to invest their resources in pushing their pet
proposals or problems” [70]. As such they can be instru-
mental in setting the policy agenda, highlighting solu-
tions to problems, getting the attention of policy makers
and thus facilitating policy change [71]. More recently
Pepin-Neff and Caporale have highlighted the import-
ance of high-profile individuals in bringing about polit-
ical change [72]. The size and central position of Jamie
Oliver’s node in the supportive coalition is suggestive of
his role as such a celebrity policy entrepreneur in the
public debate on sugar tax and highlights the increasing
sophistication and importance of public health activists.
Sustain, an alliance of organisations advocating for food
and agriculture policies and practices that enhance
health and welfare, published an analysis entitled “How
the sugary drinks tax was won: 10 lessons for committed
campaigners” [73]. They also highlight the importance of
working with high-profile advocates to take public health
campaigns to a new level of recognition and impact, as
well as facilitating alliances of medical and public health
professionals, academics, journalists and politicians [73].
Our findings support this recommendation, showing
Jamie Oliver occupying a dominant central position at
the heart of the supportive coalition, particularly in the
period before the SDIL policy announcement.
Although our use of DNA provides a number of novel
insights into the network of stakeholders active in the
sugar debate, the study has some limitations. The data
was limited to the statements attributed to stakeholders
in UK print media. Newspaper debates are only one
arena among several in which political discourse unfolds,
and this research cannot comment on the parliamentary
or judicial arenas, or any discussions that occur behind
closed doors. However, understanding public debates in
the media arena offers a useful “door opener to the
backstage of politics”, as Wodak and Meyer argue [74].
Additionally, restricting data to quotes or comments
cited in newspapers that were directly attributable to
stakeholders minimised any editorial impact. The appli-
cation of a strength of tie threshold value of ≥0.4
removed a number of inter-stakeholder associations and
allowed for a focus on only the most robust ties in the
network. A final limitation arose from restricting the
research to print media, which may have excluded stake-
holders who operate exclusively in social media. For
example, the campaign group People Against Sugar
Tax did not appear in this analysis. However, the
researchers’ shared experience of media research suggests
the number of such organisations is small.
Conclusion
In conclusion, polarisation of stakeholders visible in the
media debate on SDIL arose from differences in
ideology, focus on a specific policy and statements on
the weight of evidence. The food and drink industry
stakeholders appeared to be caught off-guard by the
specific SDIL policy announcement and seemed less co-
hesive as a coalition than might have been anticipated
based on research on other manufacturers of unhealthy
commodities. Formation of advocacy coalitions in sup-
port of upstream regulation seems dependent on align-
ment around a clear ideology and policy objectives. A
vocal celebrity policy entrepreneur could provide an
important locus for this, in the way that Jamie Oliver
appeared to do in this example of sugar tax and the SDIL.
Use of DNA methods offers the first visual map of the
SDIL network and allows exploration of a complex set of
relationships involved in framing public health policies.
Further research is needed to explore what motivated the
complex dynamic in this contested policy debate, poten-
tially through interviews with the stakeholders involved.
Further DNA analyses may be conducted around broader
public health problems, not focussed on a specific policy
measure, but instead using a health problem as a starting
point and analysing actors’ convergence on a set a
policies over time to further our understandings of
health policy making.
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